Abstract. We prove a negative result in repeated games showing that a sizable part of the set of feasible individually rational payoffs can never be supported with subgame-perfect equilibria that are at all robust to players' discount factors. We find the cutoff defining this region and interpret it as a limit on the ability to punish deviations when future rewards for randomization cannot be finely calibrated. Furthermore, we present a robust folk theorem to support payoffs in the complementary region with strategy profiles that remain subgame-perfect equilibria at all greater discount factors.
folk theorem is that of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) , henceforth FM: Any payoff profile that is feasible and strictly individual rational (henceforth FSIR) in the stage-game is the average discounted payoff of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the infinitely repeated game if each player is sufficiently patient; from the best response property inherent in any Nash equilibrium it is clear that one cannot get strictly lower payoffs, which justifies the label 'comprehensive'.
It is usual to assume in repeated games that the exact discount factors are known to all players and to the game theorist. In reality the game theorist who recommends a course of action, for example by designing mechanisms for repeated auctions, might not know the discount factor of the players exactly. If strategies are very sensitive to discount factors, small amounts of ignorance can have dramatic effects. Indeed, one can also imagine that in real life players themselves cannot be certain that the others discount the future in exactly the same way as they do. Kalai and Stanford (1988) provides a notion of discount robustness that is of use to us: strategy profiles form a Discount Robust Subgame Perfect (DRSP) equilibrium of a game if they are also an equilibrium of the same game with ever so slightly different discount factors. This is a local notion of robustness, which they show is useful in proving several results. We will additionally be interested in a stronger notion, which we dub Blackwell-Nash (BN) equilibrium, in which strategies are additionally required to form an equilibrium if players had weakly greater discount factors than initially supposed. This second notion allows a game theorist to design equilibrium strategies if all she has available is a lower bound on each player's discount factor. Nash reversion, introduced in Friedman (1971) , can give a folk theorem for BN equilibria covering part of the feasible set. However, folk theorems such as the one in FM that cover the entire FSIR set preclude deviations from equilibrium by postulating severe punishments off-path. In particular, deviating players are subjected to 'minmaxing', multiple periods where they are given their worst possible individually rational payoff. The players executing the punishment are then rewarded, in part for their mixing over actions that may offer varied stage-game payoffs in the punishment phase; they are rewarded more for using actions that give them less immediate payoff. Such rewards would be impossible to calibrate if the discount factor of each player was not precisely known. One may think, then, that as the strategies sketched by these folk theorems were not designed with discount robustness in mind, an alternative technique could support payoffs in the whole of the FSIR robustly.
This paper establishes that this is not, in general, the case. We prove a negative result, showing the existence of a critical point in the FSIR, so that points not in the positive orthant defined by it cannot be robustly supported under either notion of robustness. That is to say, our impossibility theorem shows that not only do current techniques fail to construct such strategies, but that such strategies cannot ever be constructed.
Having precluded robust equilibria in a region of the FSIR, we then set out to salvage the rest of the FSIR. We show that payoffs in (the interior of) the complement of the excluded region can always be supported robustly, with respect to both notions. In particular, we prove a discount-robustness folk theorem: for each such payoff, if players are sufficiently patient, there exist equilibrium strategies that provide that payoff that are robust to discount vectors, both locally and to all weakly greater ones.
It is perhaps surprising that although we are using two nested robustness concepts, the regions of the FSIR over which they can hold are the same. However, the two concepts share an important commonality: both require robustness to an uncountable set of discount vectors. The intuition for our results lies with the ability to calibrate punishments for deviations. If players' discount factors are fixed, players participating in the punishment of another can later be rewarded for mixing between actions that do not give the same stage-game payoff. However, if the discount factors may vary over an uncountable set, it is not possible to keep indifference under all possibilities. Therefore, certain kinds of punishments are impossible; as players will not accept payoffs that are not supported by worse punishments, they cannot get such payoffs in equilibrium. We thus show that the ability to punish, developed for (constructive) folk theorems, can therefore be thought of as a necessary condition, not merely a sufficient one, in thinking about payoffs feasible in equilibrium.
Preliminaries
We consider a standard infinitely repeated game with perfect monitoring and possibly unequal discounting. At each t ∈ Z + the (finite) stage-game G = I; (A i ) i ; (g i ) i is played, where I is the set of players {1, . . . , n}, A i is player i's finite set of actions, A := × i∈I A i is the set of all pure action profiles, and g i : A → R is player i's payoff function. A mixed action of i is α i ∈ A i , where E is the set of all probability distributions on a set E. Let a (t) ∈ A be the (realized) action profile played at time t.
1
When player i discounts future payoffs using the discount factor δ i , player i's average 1 In what follows vectors are boldfaced while scalars and sets are not. Sequence indices are denoted by superscripts and sometimes they are enclosed in parentheses to distinguish them from exponents or from another sequence denoted by the same letter; for example, c l denotes the l-th vertex of a polytope C, while {c (t) } denotes an infinite sequence of vertices each element of which is a c l for some l. Coordinates of vectors are denoted by subscripts. discounted utility defined over infinite sequences of pure actions in A is
Under perfect monitoring the public history at the end of period t is h t = (a (0) , . . . , a (t) ) ∈ A t+1 (starting with the empty history h −1 ). A pure strategy of i is s i (t + 1) :
where H t denotes the set of histories at the end of period t; mixed strategies are analogous, except that they map to the corresponding mixed actions A i . We also allow strategies to be conditioned on the realization of a publicly observable random variable (henceforth PRD), but do not explicitly model it. This describes the repeated game G ∞ (δ), where the vector δ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) is referred to as the discount factor vector. In the special case where each player discounts the future at the rate δ, we obtain the game G ∞ (δ).
Player i's minmax value is
while her pure-action minmax value is
Let m i ∈ × j (∆A j ) be a strategy profile that minmaxes i, with player i playing a best response; for the pure minmax case we define the corresponding action profile as m p,i ∈ A. The feasible set is the convex hull of the set of pure-action stage-game payoffs, F := co(g(A)), and the feasible strictly individually rational (FSIR) set is F * := {x ∈ F | x i > w i }; by analogy with it we can define
The lower boundary of F is ∂F := {x ∈ F : y ∈ F such that y << x}.
FM shows that for any v ∈ F * \∂F there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that if the common discount factor δ satisfies δ > δ, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (σ i ) i∈I of G ∞ (δ) such that for each i ∈ I, player i's payoff is v i . 
Discount Robustness
Folk theorems provide a surprisingly large set of possible equilibrium payoffs. Motivated by this, a variety of later work first questions and then proves the robustness of the folk theorem to a variety of alternative assumptions.
In this work, we ask to what extent payoffs in F * can be supported by strategies that form equilibria not at just a single discount vector, but rather a suitably larger set. However, it is not obvious what definition of robustness is appropriate. We will use two such definitions -one weak, and one strong. We borrow the first definition from Kalai and Stanford (1988) .
is a strategy profile σ such that there exists a neighborhood B of δ for which if δ ∈ B then σ is an SPNE strategy profile of the game
Intuitively, this is a weak 'local' notion as it requires equilibrium strategies of the game G ∞ (δ) to remain equilibria if the discount factor is close enough to δ. In Kalai and Stanford (1988) it is shown that if a unique stage-game best response to opponents' pure actions always exists, then a pure-strategy DRSP equilibrium involves each player playing a unique best-response strategy to opponent strategies. 3 However, one may desire, in the spirit of the folk theorems, robustness to not just nearby discounting factors but all higher discount factors. This leads to the following concept, first formally introduced in Dasgupta and Ghosh (2015).
is a strategy profile σ such that there exists a δ << δ with the property that if δ >> δ then σ is a SPNE of
This is a natural multi-player version of the single-player notion from dynamic programming, where a player's strategy in a dynamic choice problem is said to be Blackwell optimal if there exists a cutoff such that it is optimal for the single player to follow the strategy when the discount factor of the player exceeds the cutoff. If the game theorist knows that each player's discount factor exceeds a critical value, she can design strategy profiles from which no player would want to deviate. This is the sort of robustness of Friedman (1971)'s folk theorem. A BN equilibrium not only provides local robustness near δ but also to higher discount factors for each player, that is, it remains an equilibrium for all δ i ∈ [δ i , 1). Clearly, a BN equilibrium strategy profile is also a DRSP equilibrium strategy profile, but the reverse need not be true. 3 In fact, this proposition is proven using a corollary of the same power-series result we will use to prove one of our theorems. 4 The word 'formally' is far from redundant. During a conversation at Yale, Ghosh had asserted that the equilibria constructed in Dasgupta and Ghosh (2015) had the merit of not needing to be fine-tuned, being robust to small variations in discount factors. This led Johannes Hörner to verbally propose to Ghosh the notion of Blackwell-Nash equilibrium.
Our main question is to what extent is each payoff v in F * obtainable in DRSP/BN equilibria of G ∞ (δ) for sufficiently large δ? Surprisingly, despite the use of nested notions of robustness, the answers to these two questions coincide. The key to our results is that these questions turn on whether or not players need future incentives to randomize. Recall from Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) that the issue of punishments becomes relevant only when it comes to punishing a player for a deviation. If players are asked to mix over actions that will give them the same stagegame payoff, given opponents' current actions, and future play is independent of which pure action is played, players are willing to mix. On the other hand, if players are to mix among actions that give them different current payoffs, they must be compensated later for taking a worse action today. This is easy enough if the discount factor is known, 5 but it is harder to do so for multiple discount factors. In fact, we show that when the set of potential discount factors is uncountable, which is required for both DRSP and BN, it is impossible to calibrate such rewards to keep the player indifferent no matter what her discount factor is. Motivated by the above, it is clear that payoff vectors fall into one of two types, those that can be given by equilibrium strategies without mixing over actions giving different myopic payoffs, and those that can not be. If player i is to get payoff v i in a SPNE, it must be the case that she is unable to myopically best-respond to opponents' stagegame actions and do better. But if randomization can only be used when myopically indifferent, opponent actions are restricted. For instance, it may be impossible to incentivize i's opponents to minmax player i and give her the standard minmax w i . With a limited potential to punish in either kind of discount-robust equilibrium, it should come as no surprise that not all of F * remains incentive compatible.
3.1. The restricted minmax. To proceed along these lines, we must find the worst punishments that can be delivered with robustness to discount factors. To that end, we first need to define the set of action profiles where mixing does not require future rewards to generate indifference. If the action profile α is to make players myopically indifferent, each α i should involve mixing only over elements in A i that give the same payoff to i given α −i ; that is, Definition 3. An action profile α for stage-game G has the myopic indifference property if for each player i we have
Let Q ⊂ × i A i denote the set of all action profiles with the myopic indifference property. All pure action profiles trivially satisfy the definition. Nash equilibria of G also have the myopic indifference property as they specify actions that give the same (maximum) payoff given other players' actions. In fact, one way to conceive of Q is as the collected Nash equilibria of the family of stage games with pure action sets {A |A = × i A i , A i ⊂ A i }. That is, if α ∈ Q, we can modify G into some G by removing pure actions in such a way that α is a Nash equilibrium of G .
We define player i's restricted minmax (payoff) as
That is, the restricted minmax for player i is the highest payoff she can get if other players are using the worst possible actions for her, with the added constraint that those actions must form a myopically indifferent action profile when coupled with some action α i for i. Notice that the action profile used to compute r i is not necessarily myopically indifferent. Therefore it is both the case that r i is (weakly) higher than the lowest payoff i attains in Q and (weakly) lower than the lowest payoff i attains in Q when he is best responding. Now, define
As stated, pure actions profiles all trivially satisfy myopic indifference. Therefore (with some abuse of notation) we have that
and therefore that
The reader may be interested in the question of whether both inequalities in (3.5) can be strict at the same time; we provide an example where this is the case in Section 6. We are now prepared to present the paper's main results.
An Impossibility Theorem
Our first main result is that if v ∈ F res then v cannot be supported by DRSP equilibrium strategies. Quite simply, if some player i were to get below her restricted minmax payoff r i , she could do better by best-responding on a period-by-period basis; her opponents would not have a punishment apparatus available in a DRSP equilibrium that is powerful enough to dissuade her. Theorem 1. If v ∈ F res , then σ, δ such that σ is a DRSP equilibrium strategy profile of G ∞ (δ) with equilibrium payoff vector v.
Proof. Let σ be an SPNE of G ∞ (δ) with equilibrium payoff vector u(σ) = v ∈ F res .
From (3.2) we have a player i such that v i < r i . Letσ i be a strategy for player i that myopically best responds to σ −i in every period, that is,
Since σ was assumed to be an SPNE, the optimality of σ i implies that the myopic best response strategy must also give player i less than r i against the opponents' strategies:
Therefore, by definition of r i in (3.1) it follows that there is a period t such that the myopic best response gives player i less than r i :
This immediately means that there is no α i that gives (α i , σ −i (h t−1 )) the myopic indifference property. In other words, there is some player j who is not myopically indifferent at h t−1 , i.e. for some pair of actions
There are two strategies for i starting at h t−1 , denoted σ j | h t−1 and σ j | h t−1 such that one plays a j and the other a j at the starting history h t−1 ; since j plays both a j and a j with positive probability, we must have
Thus their induced player-j expected stage-game payoff sequences g
and therefore
If σ is an equilibrium strategy profile for a discount factor δ it must be the case that (4.6)
Regarded as a function of δ j ,
is a power series with bounded coefficients (as F is compact). As such, it converges absolutely for δ j ∈ (0, 1). A well-known result from complex analysis asserts that a power series either
(1) has finitely many roots in any compact subset of the interior of its disk of convergence; or (2) has all coefficients equal to 0. (1 + δ j )] and so (4.6) will not hold for all points of any neighborhood of δ j . Therefore there can be no neighborhood of δ on which σ is an SPNE, so that σ cannot be a DRSP equilibrium strategy profile.
The impossibility theorem precludes the existence of a DRSP equilibrium with payoff vector v ∈ F res and therefore also disallows the existence of equilibria satisfying the stronger BN condition. Most surprisingly, the proof shows that if v is an equilibrium payoff outside F res supported by some strategy profile σ, for any compact set of discount factors D ⊂ (0, 1) n , only up to a finite subset of D can support σ as an equilibrium strategy profile. As (0, 1) n can be written as the countable union of a collection of its compact subsets, that means that only up to a countable set of discount vectors can support σ, and those discount vectors form a totally disconnected set. That is to say, if v ∈ F res is delivered by an SPNE σ of G(δ), not only is there no neighborhood of δ where σ remains an equilibrium, but there exist neighborhoods of δ where σ is an equilibrium only at δ.
Blackwell-Nash Equilibrium Payoffs
We now ask what payoffs can be supported in Blackwell-Nash equilibria. Let F * p := {v ∈ F | v i > w p i ∀i}, where w p i is the pure strategy minmax, where players are restricted to pure strategies. It should be clear that all such payoffs can be supported in Blackwell-Nash equilibria exactly using the standard FM strategies; during the punishment phase of i all other players pick m p,i ∈ A −i , the action profile against which i's best response gives her her pure minmax payoff w p i . Player j's failure to punish a deviator is immediately detected and met with punishment (pure minmax) and forgone rewards for enforcing punishment.
Indeed one can do better. We show that all payoffs in F res may be obtained in BN equilibria and therefore in DRSP equilibria. In light of the impossibility result presented above, this really is the best one could hope for. Perhaps counter-intuitively, there is no region of the feasible set for which DRSP strategies can be constructed, but BN strategies cannot; this is despite the fact that in general, equilibrium strategies with the former property but not the latter exist. Note that as × i A i ⊆ Q, the theorem presented below can nest as a special case pure min-max punishment for payoff vectors v >> w p .
The particular theorem presented makes use of a Public Randomization Device. This allows on-path payoffs to be produced by an i.i.d. randomization over pure actions for each player every period; hence, the ex-ante expected payoff for each player in equilibrium will not depend on her discount factor. That is, not only does the theorem deliver strategies that form a Blackwell-Nash equilibrium delivering v in G ∞ (δ); they
n as well. However, proving a BN-robustness folk theorem for F res does not require a PRD. A version of this theorem which constructs BN strategies delivering v in G ∞ (δ) and arbitrarily close to v in G ∞ (δ ) for all δ ∈ [δ, 1) n and does not use a PRD is also possible. The proof of the folk theorem presented here uses a construction based on the simple strategy profiles of Abreu (1988) . Following any deviation by a player i, continuation play is identical. Naively, one may think in analogy with minmax punishments that a punishment is only feasible if the punishers are myopically indifferent on the support of their actions when the punished player is myopically best-responding. However, this is not the case. The key innovation in the proof is that if players are convinced the target of their punishment will cooperate in the punishment rather than play a myopic best-response, they can be induced to deliver harsher punishments than otherwise. By then ensuring that cooperating in one's punishment is preferable to myopically bestresponding, as the latter prolongs the punishment phase, we deter such deviation from punishment. The punished player provides the punishing players the incentives to punish, under threat that she will be required to do so for longer if she deviates. In this way, the present theorem differs substantially from previous folk theorems: the ability to incentivize the punishers and the punished is what restricts the equilibrium payoff set. Proof. Fix v ∈ F res \∂F res , where ∂F res is the lower boundary of the set. 7 Pick v ∈ F * and > 0 s.t.
For each i define a vector v i giving each j = i a 'reward' of ε:
Let α i ∈ Q be such that player i could earn her restricted minmax if she were to play a best response to the action of the other players; that is,
which is possible by inequality (5.1).
Strategies. We construct a Simple Strategy Profile a la Abreu (1988) : If j deviates at any point unilaterally then impose Phase II(j) followed by Phase III(j). Phase I : In each period play the correlated action p ∈ A such that v = a∈A p(a)g(a). Phase II(i): Play α i for N periods.
Phase III(i):
Note that the strategy, including parameters in it, is set independently of the discount factor(s).
8 Also note that we do not ask a player to best respond during her own punishment phase, as that would not leave the others willing to mix. Checking subgame perfection. Step 1. Player i does not deviate from Phase I if
7 The boundary condition is common to FM. Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1991) showed that exclusion of the lower boundary may be dispensed with. 8 In contrast, the third phase in FM depends on the exact discount factor when mixing is involved.
As δ → 1, LHS → v i and RHS → v i . In other words inequality (5.4) holds for high δ because v i < v i by (5.1).
Step 2. Player i does not deviate from Phase II(i) if
which as δ → 1 reduces to r i ≤ v i , which clearly holds with strict inequality; thus, following Abreu, we see that restarting the minmax phase suffices to deter a deviation by i.
Step 3. Player i does not deviate from Phase III(i) if
Hence we need to rearrange slightly differently:
As δ → 1, the term in square brackets tends to
which is negative by inequality (5.3), implying that Phase III(i) is an equilibrium strategy phase for large enough δ.
Step 4. Player i does not deviate (observably) from Phase II(j) or Phase III(j) because as δ → 1 deviation payoff → v i , whereas the equilibrium payoff → v i + ε.
Step 5. Although player i does not deviate observably we need to show that she mixes as required in Phase II(j). Recall our definition of Q; since α j ∈ Q, mixing only occurs between myopically indifferent actions according to α j ; as future play does not vary over i's actions on supp(α j i ), she is indifferent.
Thus, with Theorem 1 precluding robust equilibria with payoffs outside F res and Theorem 2 producing BN equilibria for all points of F res not on the lower boundary,
we have achieved a characterization of discount robust equilibrium payoffs (modulo a set of measure zero). Notice the strategies produced in Theorem 1 are invariant to the discount factors. Unlike FM, we do not adjust payoffs in Phase III based on the actions taken in Phase II. However, that adjustment was required in FM as they use 'exact' minimaxing.
Alternatively, Gossner (1995) shows that deviations may be deterred by schemes with 'approximate' minmaxing. Such 'codes of conduct' specify on-path play exactly, but allow strategies to vary in Phase II with the parameters of the model. In such a way, one can give sharp descriptions of play in Phases I and III; play during Phase II is left unspecified, but players compute a statistical test to determine whether they have approximately minmaxed the deviator, and if not, whose punishment needs to be triggered.
It should not come as a surprise that although robust equilibria for v ∈ F \ F res do not exist, one can construct equilibria with payoffs v such that only off-path play need vary with the discount factor. This further reinforces the basic intuition that discount robustness has bite because it affects the ability to punish deviations.
Example
This section provides an example game, for which we compare the feasible region F * and the robustly feasible region Table 1 . Example stage game G.
As player 2 has a strictly dominant strategy of the stage-game in M , it is easy to see that her pure, restricted and mixed minmax values coincide at r 2 = w 2 = w 
R)
for any q ∈ [0, 1]. However, as M is a strictly dominant strategy in the stage-game, player 2 will never be myopically indifferent between M and R. Therefore, player 1 can never be given such a low payoff in a BN equilibrium. Instead, the restricted minmax involves player 2 mixing between L and R. A quick computation shows that α i = ( ]. Player 1's best response to (qL+(1−q)R) is T , which would yield a payoff of 5, so r 1 = 5.
Therefore, F * = {x ∈ F |x >> (3, 2)} and F res = {x ∈ F |x >> (5, 2)}.The folk theorem in FM implies that, for instance, v = (3, 4) can be delivered in an SPNE of G ∞ (δ) for high enough δ, but Theorem 1 in this paper shows that no such SPNE is discount-robust. Figure 6 .1 shows F , F * and F res for game G. Although r 1 = w 2 means that the minimum payoff for player 2 is the same in F res and F * , the fact that r 1 > w 1 limits player 2's maximum payoff in robust equilibria.
Conclusion
We have shown that a sizable part of the FSIR, the set of payoffs proven to be equilibrium payoffs in folk theorems, cannot be supported by discount-robust strategies. Even a local notion of robustness is unattainable for equilibria with payoffs in that region. However, we have shown in a robust folk theorem that the entire complementary payoff region can be supported by both locally and strongly discount-robust equilibria. We do this by construction, designing simple strategy profiles that deliver any point in the robust region.
Furthermore, in the course of addressing the robustness question, we discover a new point of interest, the restricted minmax. We have shown that it describes the ability to punish when punishers' incentives cannot be finely tuned via future rewards for mixing. This intuition explains why certain regions of the payoff space cannot be robustly attained, and additionally, how it is possible to construct equilibria in the robustly feasible region.
Therefore, the present research establishes that care must be taken when discount factors are not precisely known. While we present a tool to get around this problem, it -and all other tools -may not always be applicable.
